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The Democratic Civil-Military Relations of Austerity:  
Thoughts about the Past and the Present 
Donald Abenheim 
1 Introduction 
How do defense institutions adjust to reductions in budgets amid an epoch of 
upheaval? This process of demobilization and retrenchment takes place amid 
the intensification of partisan politics in Western democracies made more 
toxic by an economic crisis all too similar to the 1930s. For young U.S. offic-
ers this situation burst forth without precedent. It is a shock for them unlike 
any in the decade prior of hard service. This article regards such a shock as a 
point of departure for deeper reflections about the theme of austerity and mil-
itary professionalism in the past and present. 
There are many examples in the past for this syndrome of shrinking 
treasure and proliferating military roles and missions amid political upheaval 
that have receded into forgetfulness in contemporary debates about security 
and defense policy. The following, firstly, interprets these cases in overview; 
secondly, generalizes about what unifies these episodes in their political, in-
stitutional and professional character, and, thirdly, joins this analysis to some 
thoughts about the present and future of the mutual aid and self-help of smart 
defense in the further evolution of NATO and the armed forces of Western 
democracies in general. 
An exploration of these cases of strategy, politics and defense budgets – 
offered without the customary polemics and gored oxen of political fights 
about budgets – provides a point of departure for any reflection about best 
practices and the most efficacious means to surmount such issues today and 
tomorrow. This interpretation draws some tentative conclusions as to the 
character and essence of this issue in its context of democratic civil military 
relations and to do so in a way that might diverge from the norm of custom-
ary defense management and strategic studies. 
The following introduces ideas of how to address austerity in defense in 
its essence, with an analysis that aspires to be empty of overheated rhetoric, 
polemics and propaganda that always surround the issue of the making of 
strategy and the evolution of defense and military institutions in times of 
scarcity. 
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2 Precedents 
The civil-military record of the maritime democracies (the United Kingdom 
and the United States of America), whose strategic and political culture are 
intertwined in the foundation and character of NATO, suggests that the fight 
over money in peacetime and economic trial generally takes place as a fight 
over strategy. That is, while the core issue remains the share of national 
treasure in the underfunded and abused army or navy budget, this debate 
masquerades as strategic idealism of one form of strategy as superior to an-
other – Hew Strachan’s (1997: 119–162) point in his seminal Politics of the 
British Army. These fights loom central to democratic civil-military relations; 
they are ingrained in the collective memory of soldiers and defense organiza-
tions; they have a glorious past almost like decisive battles, and the past sure-
ly suggests that such a fight is at hand amid the strategic character of the pre-
sent. 
2.1 Fundamentals, Constitutions and Geography 
In the first instance, these altercations arise from mixture of Anglo Saxon 
constitutions and geography within strategic culture. Here the interplay of 
checks and balances of the power of the purse in parliament with the supreme 
command of maritime powers (with land forces) erupt in crisis during epochs 
of budgetary scarcity. Such eruptions are called by partisans a failure of pre-
paredness and a woeful neglect of national defense. The guilty in such leg-
ends and myths are usually makers of policy and sometimes colonel blimps 
in general staffs. This process deeply shapes the military profession and the 
collective memory that underlines military policy and doctrine. 
This historical memory of austerity and the martyrdom of the military 
profession is often generalized in the U.S. forces as the legend of Task Force 
Smith, an outnumbered augmented battalion of the U.S. Army in June 1950, 
that was overwhelmed by the North Koreans in the first days of the Korean 
War (Flint 1986).1 
The sacrifice of this troop unit became the symbol of American negli-
gence to arm properly in the Cold War and, in reality, is a canard about the 
defense budget under Harry Truman. Such rhetoric and myth making of lack 
of preparedness has been especially evident since 11 September 2001, but is 
much, much older.Such legend making as a tool in the mass persuasion about 
budgets in a democracy is a natural part of the soldier and austerity. 
                                                 
1 On the Truman administration, defense policy and war, see Leffler (1992); Ho-
gan (1998). 
